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I study a regulatory process in which both the regulator and the regulated ﬁrm propose
prices that in case of disagreement are settled through ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration – a practice
currently used in Chile for setting prices in the water sector. Rather than submitting a
single oﬀer, each party simultaneously submit oﬀers for each of the cost units in which
the ﬁrm is divided. This multiplicity is believed to be responsible for the great divergence
between parties’ oﬀers observed in practice. I show, however, that reducing the number of
oﬀers makes little diﬀerence unless parties are required to submit a single oﬀer.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Departing from the more traditional rate-of return and price-cap regulations, prices of public
utilities in Chile are set using a particular form of yardstick regulation in which the benchmark-
ing is based on a hypothetical eﬃcient ﬁrm.1 Under this price setting process–introduced ﬁrst
in the electricity sector in the early 1980s–both the regulator and the regulated ﬁrm have a very
explicit interaction. Based on their own estimation for the long term costs of this hypothetical
ﬁrm, both parties propose the price to be charged by the regulated ﬁrm for the duration of
the review period (4-5 years).2 If parties cannot agree on the price, the disagreement is settled
through an arbitration process.
Since 1999 this arbitration process takes a distinct form in the water sector. In order to
prevent parties’ oﬀers to signiﬁcantly diverge, as has occurred in the other regulated sectors, the
water sector considers a ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration mechanism in which the arbitrator is constrained
to choose one of the parties’ oﬀers as a settlement.3 But because parties do no submit a single
oﬀer for the entire ﬁrm but rather an oﬀer for each of the cost units in which the ﬁrm is divided,4
the actual arbitration mechanism looks more like a hybrid between ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration (FOA)
and conventional arbitration.5
While the division of the regulated ﬁrm in various units was aimed at introducing greater
transparency into the regulatory process and avoiding subsidization across cost units, evidence
on the ﬁrst round of applying this price setting process for the diﬀerent water utilities in the
1See Vogelsang (2002) for an overview of the diﬀerent regulatory approaches practiced over the last 20 years.
2In reality, each party constructs an eﬃcient ﬁrm and announces the long term total cost that such ﬁrm would
incur in providing the service during the review period. In this construction, parties may diﬀer not only about
unit costs but also about projections of future demand.
3The use ﬁnal-oﬀe ra r b i t r a t i o ni sc o m m o n l ys e e ni nt h es e t t l e m e n t of labor disputes (with baseball as a classic
example) but I am not aware of its explicit use elsewhere in a regulatory context.
4There are approximately 200 units including, for example, cost of raw water, cost of capital, cost of replacing
pavement, etc. For more see Sánchez and Coria (2003).
5In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator is not constrained to any particular settlement. So, as the number
of units goes large, FOA approaches conventional arbitration since the arbitrator is able to chose almost any
settlement by using some combination of parties’ oﬀers.
2country has not been uncontroversial. As shown in Table 1, we observe in most cases an
important divergence between the regulator’s overall oﬀer, pr,a n dt h eﬁrm’s overall oﬀer, pf
(to facilitate the exposition pr has been normalize to 100).6 Regardless of whether privately-
owned ﬁrms are more eﬀective in reducing costs than state-owned ﬁr m s( s e eT e e p l e sa n dG l y e r
(1987)), the numbers of Table 1 suggest that both types of ﬁr m sh a v ei n c e n t i v e st o“ i n ﬂate”
costs.7 In addition, we observe that in ﬁve cases parties failed to negotiate the ﬁnal price, ps,
and had instead resorted to FOA.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE OR BELOW
The numbers in Table 1 also raise the issue about the factors that might characterize
the contract zone of Farber and Bazerman (1989), i.e., the range of settlements that both
parties prefer to disagreement. Ownership status seems to explain, at least in part, why some
parties are more likely to reach agreement than others. In fact, for 3 of the 6 privately-owned
companies,8 prices were determined through arbitration while for only 2 of the 9 state-owned
companies, prices were determined in such a way. Firm size, which may serve as a proxy
for ﬁrm’s complexity and uncertainty about the arbitrator’ preferences,9 also seems relevant
(although the largest two ﬁrms also happens to be in private hands). Given the small sample
size, however, there is no much else that can be said.
The great divergence in parties’ oﬀers have raised more fundamental questions. Some ob-
servers have challenged the advantages of the current regulatory mechanism over more conven-
tional mechanisms, particularly price-caps as practiced in the UK, while others have questioned
6The numbers shown are based on parties’ announcements of long term total costs.
7Even though it may no retain any proﬁts, a state-owned ﬁr mh a sa l s oi n c e n t i v e st oi n ﬂate costs in an eﬀort
to improve its (ex-post) performance.
8With the exception of Aguas Cordillera, these companies have gone private only recently: 1-2 years before
the price reviews.
9As demonstrated by Farber (1980), divergence in parties’ oﬀer increases with uncertainty about the arbitra-
tor’s preferences.
3the privatization process itself arguing that the increase in information asymmetries have more
than oﬀset any productivity gains.10 Rather than introducing radical changes in both the pri-
vatization program and the regulatory scheme, the authority is exploring ways in which the
actual divergence in parties’ oﬀers could be diminished. In particular, it is proposing to sub-
stantially reduce the multiplicity of oﬀers, i.e., the numbers of units in which the regulated ﬁrm
is divided. Reducing the number of oﬀers seems reasonable since it would make the arbitration
process look less like the cheap-talk game associated to conventional arbitration.
Motivated by these concerns and proposed solutions, in this paper I develop a simple model
to explore the extent to which a reduction in the number of units brings parties’ oﬀers closer
to each other. In so doing, I extend the model of Farber (1980) to the case in which parties
simultaneously submit oﬀers for each of the units that are part of the item in dispute and
the arbitrator is limited to choose one party’s oﬀer or the other for each unit, so in principle,
he is free to fashion a compromise by awarding some oﬀers to one party and the rest to the
second party. Despite this variant of FOA was already recognized by Farber in his article (he
calls it “issue by issue” FOA), its formal modelling has been postponed. Understanding the
equilibrium properties of this arbitration game is not only relevant for the price setting process
that motivated this paper,11 but more generally, for any FOA in which more than one issue is
in dispute (e.g., a union and a ﬁrm negotiating salaries for a group of jobs, a government and
a contractor renegotiating a multi-part contract, etc.).
The model of the paper is based on a one-period game that considers two parties (i.e.,
the ﬁrm and the regulator) with opposing preferences that simultaneously submit oﬀers to an
arbitrator whose ideal settlement is imperfectly known by both parties (recall that parties’
10See Gomez-Lobo and Vargas (2002) for a further discussion on the shortcomings of the current regulatory
scheme.
11This arbitration scheme has also been proposed in place of the current mechanisms used to settle disputes
over regulated prices in the electricity and telecommunication sectors in Chile.
4uncertainty regarding the arbitrator’s preferences is what leads to oﬀers divergence). As in
Farber (1980) and the literature that has followed (e.g., Gibbons, 1988), I do not include a
previous stage in which parties bargain over the ﬁnal price before going to arbitration, so I do
not intent to explain what makes parties more likely to reach an agreement rather than end in
arbitration.12 The main result of the paper is that the division of the ﬁrm in just two units
introduce enough ﬂexibility in parties’ strategies so that there are multiple equilibria. The
multiplicity associated to this two-oﬀers game implies that in equilibrium the distance between
the parties’ overall oﬀers is not unique but varies from that obtained for the single-oﬀer game,
which is unique, to virtually inﬁnity.13
These results are interesting for both technical and practical reasons. From a technical
perspective, it is interesting to observe that the introduction of just a bit of uncertainty on the
arbitrator’s preferences produces dramatic changes in the equilibrium of the game. If parties are
fully certain about the arbitrator’s ideal settlement, the equilibrium of the game shows perfect
convergence regardless the numbers units that constitute the ﬁrm. Conversely, if parties are
not fully certain and there are two or more units, divergence between parties’ oﬀers can be
arbitrarily large in equilibrium. The practical implications of the results of the paper, on the
other hand, are rather clear: the authority’s proposal that call for a reduction in the number
of cost units from something like 200 to 50 oﬀers (or to two units for that matter) would make
little diﬀerence, if any, in its eﬀort to lower parties divergence.
I should emphasize that this paper is by no means an attempt to discuss the overall opti-
mality of this regulatory approach relative to alternative approaches but rather understand the
eﬀect of regulatory design on parties behavior. With that objective in mind, the rest of the
12For a discussion see Farber and Bazerman (1989).
13Using a focal point argument, one could argue that the likely outcome of the game is one in which parties’
oﬀers locate at the limits of the interval that supports the arbitrator’s ideal settlement.
5paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the model for the single-oﬀer game (in
Appendix A I explain the eﬀect of risk aversion). In Section 3, I extend the model to multiple
oﬀers. I develop the two-oﬀers case in the text and show in Appendix B that the results carry
over to the case of three or more oﬀers. Using the results of these two sections, in Section 4, I
explore whether and to what extent a reduction in the number of oﬀers (i.e., ﬁrm’s divisions)
lead to greater convergence in parties’ overall oﬀers. Concluding remarks are in Section 5.
2 The Model
Consider the following simple model of price regulation in which a regulator and regulated ﬁrm
submit an oﬀer for the price to be charged by the regulated ﬁrm. In case of price disagreement,
the ﬁnal price is settled through FOA. Let pr and pf denote the regulator’s and ﬁrm’s price oﬀers.
Following Farber (1980), the arbitrator is characterized by the parameter z, which describes the
arbitrator’s most preferred settlement.14 If the actual settlement is p, the arbitrator’s utility is
va(p,z)=−(p − z)2. In FOA, the arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the parties’ oﬀers
as a settlement. Given this utility function and assuming that in equilibrium the regulator’s
oﬀer will be smaller than the ﬁrm’s oﬀer, the arbitrator will choose the regulator’s oﬀer if and
only if z<p,w h e r ep =( pr + pf)/2.
The parties are assumed to be risk-neutral and equally uncertain about the value of z.T h e
parties believe that z is randomly distributed on the interval [zl,z h] according to the cumulative
distribution function F(z),w i t hd e n s i t yf(z). Hence, given the parties’ oﬀers, the probability
that the regulator’s oﬀer is accepted is F(p). Contrary to Farber (1980), here parties do not
have strictly opposed preferences. The ﬁrm simply seeks to maximize the expected settlement.
14Note that I am assuming that the arbitrator learns nothing from the parties’ oﬀers about the ideal settlement
(i.e., the true cost of providing the service eﬃciently). I comment on this issue of learning in the concluding
section.
6The regulator, on the other hand, seeks to minimize the expected settlement (i.e., maximize
expected consumer surplus) taking into account that the ﬁrm should obtain a fair return on
their investments and not go bankrupt.
The timing of the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game is as follows. First, the regulator and the ﬁrm
simultaneously submit their oﬀers to the arbitrator.15 Second, the arbitrator chooses the oﬀer
that maximizes his utility function va(p,z) as the settlement. The parties’ Nash equilibrium
oﬀers (pf and pr) maximize their expected payoﬀs so they are found by simultaneously solving
max
pf prF(p)+pf[1 − F(p)] (1)
min
pr (1 − λ1)prF(p)+[ 1− λ2]pf[1 − F(p)] (2)
where 0 <λ<1 is a known parameter intended to capture the regulator’s concern about ﬁrm’s
proﬁts. Since the regulator should be less concerned about ﬁrm’s proﬁts when the settlement
chosen by the arbitrator is pf,w el e t∆λ ≡ λ1 − λ2 > 0.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for this optimization problem are16
(pf − pr)f(p)/2=1− F(p) (3)



















15As in Farber (1980) and subsequent papers I do not explicitly model a ﬁrst stage where parties can bargain
before going to arbitration. We can think of p
r and p
f as the last oﬀers during the bargaining period.
16Note that the convexity of the arbitrator’s utility function assures the existence of equilibrium.
7This Nash equilibrium reduces to the one obtained by Farber (1980) for ∆λ =0 .I nt h i sc a s e
the parties’ oﬀers are centered around the mean of the parties’ belief about the arbitrator’s
ideal settlement (i.e., z) and the distance between the equilibrium oﬀers decreases as this
belief becomes more precise (i.e., higher f(·)). In the limit, when there is no uncertainty
about the arbitrator’s preferences, both parties submit the arbitrator’s ideal settlement, that is
pr = pf = z.W h e n∆λ>0, however, Farber’s equilibrium changes. More speciﬁcally
Proposition 1 When the regulator puts some weight on ﬁrm’s proﬁt, the parties’ oﬀers are
centered above the mean z and the distance between the parties’ oﬀers decreases.
The trade-oﬀ detected by Farber (1980) still applies here. In equilibrium, each party must
balance a trade-oﬀ between making a more aggressive oﬀer and reducing the probability that
the oﬀer will be chosen by the arbitrator. When ∆λ>0, the regulator does not want to be as
aggressive and, hence, the distance between parties’ oﬀers reduces. In addition, as the distance
shrinks with λ1 [see eq. (6)], one may wonder whether oﬀers could eventually coincide. For
example, if z distributes uniformly on [a,b],i ti sn o td i ﬃcult to show that when ﬁrm’s proﬁts
are less important to the regulator (i.e., λ =0or ∆λ =0 ), parties’ oﬀers show maximum
diﬀerentiation, that is pf = b and pr = a.W h e n∆λ>0, on the other hand, parties’ oﬀers are
pf = b and pr = a+∆λb/2(1−λ1). Then, for a = b/2 and λ2 =0 , pr would approach pf as λ1
approaches 0.5.17
The above example also show that the expected settlement, E[ps], increases with the weight
the regulator puts on ﬁrm’s proﬁt( i . e . ,λ1) and could eventually reach b.18 This is a more general
result that derives directly from Proposition 1. Provided that E[ps] is the ﬁrm’s objective
17Note that p
r cannot be greater than p
f in equilibrium; otherwise second order conditions would not be
satisﬁe d .I ns u c hc a s et h es o l u t i o ni sp
f = p
r.
18For this speciﬁce x a m p l ew eh a v eE[p
s]=( a + b)/2+γ
2/2(b − a),w h e r eγ = ∆λb/2(1 − λ1).
8function, from the envelope theorem we have
∂E[ps]
∂λ1




Without explicitly solving for pr and pf it is possible to demonstrate that (7) is positive. The
term in brackets is positive from (4). On the other hand, ∂pr/∂λ1 is positive from both (5) and
(6). In fact, if pr falls with λ1, pf must increase by a larger amount for (5) to hold. But that
w o u l dl e a do ﬀers to be further apart, contradicting (4). Neither can we have, from (5), a fall
in pf accompanied of no change in pr.
If for some reason one believes that a regulator is more likely to assign higher weight to
proﬁts of state-owned ﬁrms, then, the numbers of Table 1 would be somewhat consistent with
the analysis presented here: parties’ oﬀers for state-owned companies are expected to be closer
to each other and, hence, more likely to fall within the contract zone (or agreement zone). The
same analysis would also indicate, however, that the ﬁnal price for state-owned companies are
expected to be higher than for privately-owned companies, other things equal.
Finally, it is worth asking whether risk-aversion can bring parties’ oﬀers even closer. Ab-
stracting from proﬁt weights to isolate the eﬀect of risk-aversion and assuming identical utility
functions, Appendix A demonstrates that risk aversion reduces the average of the parties’ oﬀers
but does not necessarily decrease the distance between them.
3M u l t i p l e o ﬀers
An important diﬀerence between Farber’s model and the regulatory scheme studied in this paper
is that parties do not submit a single oﬀer but multiple oﬀers. Consider then the case in which
the regulated ﬁrm is divided in two units or production centers: 1 and 2 (e.g., water production
9and water distribution).19 Since we understand the implications of not having parties with
strictly opposing preferences, in what follows I omit proﬁt weights to simplify notation.
In this multiple-oﬀer game, the regulator and the regulated ﬁrm submit simultaneously
price oﬀers for each of the two units. The regulator’s oﬀers are denoted by pr
1 and pr
2 and the




2. The arbitrator’s task is to choose a price oﬀer for each
unit following a FOA procedure. The arbitrator will choose prices p1 and p2 that maximize its
utility va(p1,p 2,z)=−(p1 + p2 − z)2. Then, there will be four possible oﬀer combinations for













Note that since the possibility of submitting multiple oﬀers only aﬀect parties’ strategy
space but not the actual operation of the water utility (the ﬁrm will minimize costs regardless
the price chosen for each unit), both parties and the arbitrator only care about the overall oﬀer
p = p1+p2 (i.e., about the ﬁnal price to be paid by consumers) and not about the price of each
individual unit.
3.1 Certainty about the arbitrator’s preferences
It is useful to start by studying the game in which both parties know the arbitrator’s ideal
settlement because it helps to illustrate equilibrium properties that may carry over to the
uncertainty case. Parties’ action space and arbitrator’s ideal settlement z are depicted in
Figure 1. More speciﬁcally, parties’ oﬀers for units 1 and 2 are in the horizontal and vertical
axis, respectively. For example, point A represents a regulator’s oﬀer consisting of Apr
1 for the
ﬁrst unit and Apr
2 for the second unit. The line z, on the other hand, contains those combinations
of p1 and p2 that add up to z. The arbitrator is indiﬀerent between any two combinations that
lie on this line.

















































Figure 1: Two-oﬀers game under certainty
As in the one-oﬀer case, an obvious equilibrium of the game is for each party i to submit
ap a i r{pi
1,p i
2} where pi ≡ pi
1 + pi
2 = z. We know that if party i submits an overall oﬀer of
pi = z,p a r t yj’s best response is not constrained to any oﬀer because the arbitrator would
pick pi regardless his oﬀer. But for pi = z to be a best response to party j’s oﬀer, we must





Let us explore now whether a pair of oﬀers equally distant from the line z,s u c ha sA and
B in Figure 1 (OA = OB), could also constitute an equilibrium of the game . If this were the
c a s e ,w ec o u l do b s e r v eo ﬀers divergence in equilibrium but with the same settlement outcome as







because both yield z; her ideal settlement. However, this is not a suitable equilibrium candidate.
11If the regulator is playing A,t h eﬁrm’s best response is not playing B but playing C,w h e r e
O0C0 = O00C00 = OA−   and   is a very small positive number. This play leaves the arbitrator
indiﬀerent between C0 = {Apr
1,C p
f
2} and C00 = {Cp
f
1,A pr
2} with a price settlement of z + AO
− >z ).20 And following the same logic, we know that A cannot be the best response to C
but something further apart (more precisely, three times larger than OC). As this illustration
shows, there is no best-response correspondence oﬀ the z-line. To summarize
Proposition 2 If both parties know the arbitrator’s preference z, the Nash equilibria of the
two-oﬀers game are pi ≡ pi
1 + pi
2 = z for i = r,f.
This proposition indicates that the introduction of multiple oﬀers (as many as the number
of units in which the ﬁrm has been divided) does not aﬀect the perfect convergence of parties’
oﬀers when there is certainty about the arbitrator’s preferences. Although it has only been
formally shown for the two-oﬀers case, it should be clear that Proposition 2 extends to the case
of three or more oﬀers.21 This is an interesting result because one would think that as the
number of oﬀers increase the arbitration process would converge to conventional arbitration in
the sense that the arbitrator can impose almost any settlement he wishes by choosing the right
combination of parties’ oﬀers. But in conventional arbitration we know that in equilibrium we
can observe either any oﬀers (as in any cheap-talk game) or maximum diﬀerentiation if the
arbitrator is believed to split diﬀerences.
20If for any reason the regulator’s oﬀer is to the north-east of the line z,t h eﬁrm’s best response is to play any
pair equally or further distant from z in the north-east direction.
21A simple example should be enough here. Consider a three-oﬀe r sg a m ei nw h i c ht h ea r b i t r a t o r ’ si d e a l
settlement is z =$ 1 0 . If the regulator submits the oﬀer p
r = {1,2,3},w h i c hi s$ 4o ﬀ the z-plane, the ﬁrm’s best
response is not to play a symmetrically distant oﬀer such as p
f
a = {3,5,6} but to play p
f
b = {8.99,9.99,10.99},
where 0.01 is the smallest possible number, say, a penny. By submitting the latter the ﬁrm assures itself a
settlement of 13.99.S i n c ep
r is, by the same arguments, not the regulator’s best response to p
f
b, we cannot have
an equilibrium with parties’ oﬀers located oﬀ the z-plane.
123.2 Uncertainty about the arbitrator’s preferences
Let us now turn to the case in which the parties are uncertain about the arbitrator’s preferences.
To estimate the probability that the arbitrator choose a particular oﬀer combination we need
ﬁrst to understand some regularities that prevail in equilibrium. From the certainty case we
know that if the regulator plays something like A,t h eﬁrm’s best response will lie somewhere
along the line ABC depending on the value of z (if by any chance the z-line falls to the south-




k =1 ,2,22 which, in turn, assures that pf >p r in equilibrium.
Since p1 and p2 are perfect substitutes, we can adopt the convention that in equilibrium
pi
2 ≥ pi






1. The probabilities can then be found by
dividing the z space in four diﬀerent regions, each supporting the election of one particular oﬀer
combination. Depending on the parties’ oﬀers there will be values z1 <z 2 <z 3 such that if z
falls in the region (−∞,z 1), the arbitrator will choose {pr
1,p r
2},i fz falls in the region [z1,z 2) the
arbitrator will choose {p
f
1,p r






























2)[1 − F(z3)] (8)



















2)[1 − F(z3)] (9)




































1]:F(z3) − F(z2)+F(z1)+( pr
1 − p
f












Although the solution involves multiple equilibria as in the certainty case (any of the four








k] denotes the ﬁrst-order condition for pi
k), they all must satisfy the conditions above that
rearranged leads to
Proposition 3 When f(·) is a symmetric probability density function the two-oﬀers Nash equi-
libria present the following characteristics: the parties’ (overall) oﬀers are centered around the
mean z and the distance between them cannot be smaller than in the single-oﬀer case.
Proof. Let us prove ﬁr s tt h a tp a r t i e s ’o ﬀers are centered around z, i.e., F(z2 = p)=1 /2.




2 > 0 and that z2 = p.





i = r, f.
14Combine (10) with (12) and (11) with (13) to obtain, respectively




1)[f(z1) − f(z3)]/2 (15)
In addition, we know that
z3 − z2 = z2 − z1 (16)
Given the perfect colinearity between ﬁrst-order conditions (which implies that we have 3
equations for 4 unknowns), we can make an unrestricted selection for one of the 4 oﬀers,
or alternatively, for ∆ ≡ p
f
1 − pr
1 > 0. Furthermore, any particular value of ∆ leads to a
unique equilibrium given the parties’ objective functions (including the arbitrator’s) that we
are considering here.25 And since f(z1)=f(z3) and F(z2)=1 /2 is an equilibrium candidate in
that solves the system (14)—(16) for any ∆ > 0 and a symmetric density function, uniqueness
implies that z2 = z. On the other hand, to ﬁnd an expression for the distance between parties’
oﬀers add (10) and (12) and rearrange to obtain
















2 and pr = pr
1 + pr
2. Replacing f(z3)=f(z1) and z2 = z, eq. (17) can be
re-written as












25Uniqueness can be easily proved using the results from the certainty case. If the regulator’s oﬀer is, say, the
pair A of Figure 1, the ﬁrm’s best response for a given value of z is unique and equal to the pair C of Figure 1 (if
for some value of z the pair A falls to the north-east of the z-line, the ﬁrm’s best response is A). And since the
ﬁrm’s best response is a non-decreasing function of z (strictly increasing if A is to the south-west of the z-line),
the ﬁrm’s best response to A is unique when z ∈ [zl,z h] according to F(z).
15Since ∆ ≡ p
f
1 − pr
1 > 0 can be arbitrarily small and f(z1) ≤ f(z) for any distribution function
that is not U-shaped, the distance between oﬀers will be equal or larger than in the single-oﬀer
case.
Proposition 3 suggests that decreasing the number of oﬀers (i.e., ﬁrm’s divisions) may
not necessarily reduce the distance between the parties’ oﬀers as intended in the authority’s
proposal. Without specifying f(·), however, it is hard to provide further insights about the
equilibrium properties of this arbitration game. In the next section I add more structure to
the equilibrium solution by considering a couple of density functions and I investigate, among
other things, the possibility that in equilibrium both z1 and z3 fall outside the interval [zl,z h].
Before moving to the next section there are three issues worth mentioning. The ﬁrst is about
the equilibrium properties for an asymmetric density function. We know that in the single-oﬀer
case parties’ oﬀers are centered around the mean z regardless of f(·).I n t h e t w o - o ﬀers case,
however, parties’ oﬀers are no longer centered around z for an asymmetric density function but
they can be above or below z. The second is about the equilibrium properties for a U-shaped
density function. Although it is hard to conceive such a shape in practice, eq. (18) indicates
that the distance could in principle decrease by going from a single oﬀer to two oﬀers if, in
equilibrium, z1 ∈ [zl,z h]. Since it is possible to show that in equilibrium z1 and z3 could fall
either outside or inside [zl,z h] (see footnote 28), an increase in convergence is a possibility.
A ﬁnal issue concerns the extension of the model to three or more oﬀers. As shown in the
Appendix B, the equilibrium properties contained in Proposition 3 carry over to the three-oﬀers
game. Following the same procedure, it can be shown that they carry over to a game with a
higher number of oﬀe r sa sw e l l .
164C o n v e r g e n c e o f o ﬀers
The authority’s new proposal rests on the intuition that a reduction in the number of oﬀers (i.e.,
number of units in which the regulated ﬁrm is divided) should bring parties’ oﬀers somehow
closer. To be more precise about whether and how a reduction in the numbers of oﬀers aﬀects
the convergence of parties’ oﬀers we need to add more structure to the model by specifying the
density function f(·). To work with closed-form solutions, I consider ﬁrst a uniform distribution
and then a triangular distribution.
When f(z) is a uniform distribution over the interval [a,b], the equilibrium solution for the
single-oﬀer case is straightforward: parties’ oﬀers exhibit maximum diﬀerentiation among the
arbitrator’s possible ideal settlements, that is pr = a and pf = b (note that nothing prevents
parties to submit oﬀers that fall outside the interval [a,b]).
Obtaining the equilibria for the two-oﬀers case is more involved. We need to know whether
in equilibrium z1 and z3 fall inside or outside [a,b].L e t a s s u m e ﬁrst (to be checked later)
that z1 and z3 fall inside [a,b],t h a ti sz1 ≥ a and z3 ≤ b. From Proposition 3 we know that
pf − pr = b − a and (pf + pr)/2=( a + b)/2, so in equilibrium we have that pr ≡ pr
1 + pr
2 = a




2 = b, as in the single-oﬀer case. For this to be indeed an equilibrium we need







z1 ≥ a and z3 ≤ b. T od ot h i s ,l e tpr
1 = a/2 − α and p
f
1 = b/2 − β,w h e r eα and β are two
arbitrarily chosen parameters that deﬁne an speciﬁce q u i l i b r i u m( w eh a v eo n ee x t r ad e g r e eo f
freedom than usual because f(z) is constant, or more precisely, symmetric). Using pr = a and
pf = b to obtain that pr
2 = a/2+α and p
f































As long as α and β are chosen such that β − α ≤ (b − a)/2, eqs. (19) and (20) indicate that
there are multiple equilibria in which the distance between parties’ oﬀers remains unchanged
from the single-oﬀer case, i.e., pf − pr = b − a.
Following a similar procedure it is possible to show that there are also multiple equilibria
in which z1 and z3 fall outside [a,b] and the distance between parties’ oﬀers is greater than in
the single-oﬀer case, i.e., pf − pr >b− a.S i n c e f(z1)=f(z3)=0 , from Proposition 3 we
know that pf − pr = b−a+2 ( p
f
1 −pr
1) and (pf +pr)/2=( a+ b)/2. To corroborate that there






2) satisfying z1 <aand z3 >b ,l e t
again pr
1 = a/2 − α and p
f
1 = b/2 − β. Given these deﬁnitions and the equilibrium conditions
of Proposition 3 we have that pr
2 = a − b/2+β and p
f
2 = b − a/2+α. Replacing these values
into z1 and z3 we obtain














As before, as long as α and β are chosen such that β−α<(b−a)/2, eqs. (21) and (22) indicate
that there are multiple equilibria in which the distance between parties’ oﬀe r si sg r e a t e rt h a n
in the single-oﬀer case, i.e., pf − pr >b− a.26 Given the multiplicity of equilibria this exercise
illustrates that increasing the numbers of oﬀers does not necessarily lead to greater divergence
in parties’ oﬀers. One can even argue that because the pair {pr = a,pf = b} is the only focal
outcome of this game (especially if oﬀers way oﬀ the arbitrator’s range of preferences may be
perceived as unreasonable and disregarded as in Farber and Bazerman (1986)), an increase in
26Provided that p
f −p
r =2 ( b−a)+2(α−β) and that β−α can take an arbitrarily large negative value, there
is no limit on the distance between partie’s oﬀers that can be observed in equilibrium. Note also that as β − α
approaches (b − a)/2, p
f − p
r approaches b − a.
18the number of oﬀers is unlikely to aﬀect convergence when both parties assume that arbitrator’s
preferences are uniformly distributed.
It remains to be seen whether these results also hold for distribution functions in which
parties assign more weight to intermediate values, which can be regarded as a more reasonable
assumption for parties’ priors. For simplicity, let us assume that f(z) is a symmetric triangular
distribution over the interval [0,2a], which means that f(z)=z/a2 if 0 ≤ z ≤ a, 2/a − z/a2 if
a ≤ z ≤ 2a and 0 otherwise (oﬀers can take negative values). Following the analysis of Section
2f o rλ =0 , it can be shown that the unique equilibrium for the single-oﬀer case is pr = a/2
and pf =3 a/2, i.e., the distance between parties’ oﬀers is a.
If we now extend the game to two-oﬀers, Proposition 3 indicates that in equilibrium it holds
pf − pr = a − 2(p
f
1 − pr
1)[z1/a − 1] (23)
Using z2−z1 =( p
f
2−pr
2)/2 and z2 = z = a,w eh a v et h a tpf −pr =2 ( a−z1)+p
f
1−pr
1.R e p l a c i n g
the latter into (23) and making ∆ = p
f
1 − pr
1 > 0 our arbitrary choice (alternatively, one can
pick one of the four oﬀers), we obtain that z1 = a/2 and, hence, pf − pr = a + ∆. This result
and (pf +pr)/2=z = a allows us then to establish that in equilibrium pr ≡ pr
1+pr
2 =( a−∆)/2




2 =( 3 a + ∆)/2.27
Since there are no restrictions on the (arbitrary) selection of ∆ other than it has to be
positive, the distance between parties’ oﬀers associated to each of these multiple of equilibria
can be anything from a (when ∆ ≈ 0)t oi n ﬁnity. Although we cannot rule out that moving from
one to two oﬀers (or vice versa) may have no eﬀect on oﬀers convergence, the focal argument
27The particular shape of the density function (f(z1)=f(z2)/2 in equilibrium) adds an additional degree of








2) requires, in addition to ∆,




2 by convention, the selection’s only
restriction is p
r
1 <a / 2 or p
f
2 > 3a/2). For example if we take ∆ =3 a and p
r
1 = −3a, the rest of the equilibrium
is given by p
r





19deployed above would suggest the pair {pr =0 ,p f =2 a} as the likely outcome of the game
resulting in a doubling of the distance between parties’ oﬀers from the single-oﬀer case.28
What is remarkable from both of these exercises (and more generally)29 is that the division
of the regulated ﬁrm into two units already provide parties with enough ﬂexibility for their
oﬀers to exhibit, in equilibrium, a degree of convergence that can be anywhere from that in
the single-oﬀer case to virtually inﬁnity. This is a most important result because proposals to
foster oﬀers convergence consider reductions in the number of oﬀe r st on ol e s st h a n5 0u n i t s , 30
which, according to the results of this paper, would prove innocuous.
To ﬁnish, it may be worth indicating that allowing parties not to have strictly opposing
preferences (as in Section 2) does not introduce any substantial changes to the results. Parties
oﬀer’s will be centered above the mean z (see Proposition 1) but the multiplicity of equilibria
will be maintained.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Prices of public utilities in Chile are set using a particular form of yardstick regulation in which
the benchmarking is a hypothetical eﬃcient ﬁrm. Based on their own estimation for the long
term costs of this hypothetical ﬁrm, both the regulator and the regulated ﬁrm propose the price
to be charged by the regulated ﬁrm. If parties cannot agree on the ﬁnal price, the disagreement
is settled through and arbitration process that in the water sector takes the form of ﬁnal-oﬀer
arbitration (FOA) applied to each of the cost units that constitute the ﬁrm. Motivated by
the large divergence in parties’ oﬀers that we observe in practice, I have extended Farber’s
28This analysis can be easily extended to a U-shaped density function. Consider, for example, a symmetric
inverted triangular function over the interval [0,2a] for which f(0) = f(2a)=2 /3a and f(a)=1 /3a.I tf o l l o w s
from Proposition 3 that in equilibrium holds that z2 = z = a and z1 = a(3∆−a)/[2(∆+a)]. Therefore, as long
as a/3 < ∆ < 3a,t h et w o - o ﬀers equilibrium will exhibit more convergence than the single-oﬀer equilibrium.
29Numerical results for other distributions (including the unimodal symmetric beta distribution and other
no-symmetric distributions) are qualitatively the same.
30I understand that a reduction to three units was at some point considered but ultimately discarded.
20single-oﬀer model to the case in which parties submit two or more oﬀers. I found that moving
from a single oﬀer to just two oﬀers provide parties with such ﬂexibility that there are multiple
equilibria. More importantly, the distance between the parties’ overall oﬀe r si nt h i st w o - o ﬀers
game is not unique but varies from that obtained for the single-oﬀer game, which is unique, to
virtually inﬁnity.
The above result is interesting for technical and practical reasons. From a technical per-
spective, it is interesting to observe that the introduction of just a bit of uncertainty on the
arbitrator’s preferences produces dramatic changes in the equilibrium of the game. If parties are
fully certain about the arbitrator’s ideal settlement, the equilibrium of the game shows perfect
convergence regardless the numbers units that constitute the ﬁrm. Conversely, if parties are
not fully certain and there are two or more units, there are equilibria of the game that exhibit
unlimited divergence between parties’ oﬀers. Using a focal point argument, one could certainly
argue that the likely outcome of the game is one in which parties’ oﬀers locate at the limits of
the interval that supports the arbitrator’s ideal settlement.
The practical reasons, on the other hand, are rather clear. According to the results of the
paper, the authority’s proposal that call for a reduction in the number of oﬀers (i.e., units) from
something like 200 to 50 oﬀers (or to two oﬀers for that matter) would make little diﬀerence, if
any, in its eﬀort to lower parties divergence.
There are several issues related to this regulatory approach, and more generally, to any
FOA procedure with multiple oﬀers that are not covered in the paper. First, I assumed that
the arbitrator’s preferences are not aﬀected by parties’ oﬀers. Empirical studies of arbitrator
behavior shows (e.g., Farber and Bazerman, 1986; Ashenfelter and Bloom, 1984), however, that
arbitrators do use parties’ oﬀers to compute their ideal settlement and then choose the oﬀer
closer to this ideal. Gibbons (1989) studies the equilibrium properties of a single-oﬀer FOA
21game in which both parties share a common perception about the true value of the item in
question (here, the cost of the eﬃcient ﬁrm). The arbitrator is less informed about the true
value of the item than both of the parties but he upgrades his beliefs after observing the parties’
oﬀers (signals). Despite parties consider the gain from misleading the arbitrator when choosing
their oﬀers, Gibbons (1989) shows that in perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium parties ﬁnd
it optimal not to so.31 Rather they submit truthful oﬀers that are closer to each other because
when arbitrator learns about the value of the item parties’ uncertainty regarding the arbitrator’s
ideal settlement is necessarily reduced.
It remains to be seen whether in a two-oﬀers game parties still ﬁnd it optimal to not mislead
the arbitrator in equilibrium. If so, parties’ oﬀers could not exhibit the unlimited divergence that
we found in the no-learning case; otherwise there seems to be no learning (it is hard to believe
that the arbitrator would learn the same regardless whether parties’ oﬀers are close to each
other or very far apart). But since the equilibrium structure of the single-oﬀer learning game is
the same as the structure of the no-learning game,32 it may very well be that learning becomes
irrelevant in a game with two or more oﬀers. Along these lines, it would be also important,
particularly in regulation, to study the case in which one of the parties (here, the ﬁrm) is
much better informed about the true value of the item than the other party. This asymmetric
information game has not yet been studied, so it is an open area for future research.
The paper is also silent about the question of why parties came to be in arbitration. Em-
pirical and experimental work comparing conventional and ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration shows that
it is not clear whether dispute rates (i.e., number of negotiations that end in arbitration) and
distance between parties’ oﬀers are greater in conventional arbitration than in FOA (Farber and
Bazerman, 1986 and 1989; and Ashenfelter et al., 1992). If we believe that a multi-oﬀer FOA
31There is also continuum of pooling equilibria in which the arbitrator learns nothing from the parties’ oﬀers.
32Compare eqs. (6) and (7) with (17) and (18) of Gibbons (1989).
22is not very diﬀerent form conventional arbitration in that any distance between the parties’
oﬀers can be observed in equilibrium (as in cheap-talk game), one could argue that reducing
the number of oﬀe r st oas i n g l eo ﬀer could, on the one hand, increase convergence among parties
that are going to arbitration but, on the other hand, increase the number of parties that end
up in arbitration. Therefore, if negotiated settlements are valuable from a policy standpoint
because it allows parties more discretion in negotiating their own settlement (Farber, 1980), a
drastic reduction to a single-oﬀer may lead to undesirable outcomes, i.e., too much arbitration.
Finally, there is the question about the overall optimality of this regulatory approach rel-
ative to alternative approaches such as cost-of-return and price-cap schemes. Perhaps more
realistic within the existing regulatory scheme, it is to ask for ways in which the construction
of the hypothetical eﬃcient ﬁrm could be improved. Following the yardstick regulatory scheme
practiced in the water sector in the UK, one possibility it is to require, at least partially, the
use of actual costs from previous review periods and from other water utilities.
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Appendix A: The eﬀect of risk-aversion
Let the utility function of both the regulator and the ﬁrm be the same and denoted by u(p),
with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.T h eﬁrst order conditions for pf and pr are, respectively
f(p)[u(pr) − u(pf)]/2+u0(pf)[1 − F(p)] = 0 (24)
f(p)[u(pr) − u(pf)]/2+u0(pr)F(p)=0 (25)
where p =( pr+pf)/2. Substracting (25) from (24) and rearranging gives F(p)=u0(pf)/(u0(pr)+
u0(pf)). And since u00(·) < 0,w eh a v et h a tF(p) < 1/2, i.e., p<z. On the other hand, we
24know from the mean value theorem that there exist a ξ ∈ (pr,p f) such that u(pf) − u(pr)=
u0(ξ)[pf − pr]. Replacing the latter in (25) yields







While F(p) < 1/2, u0(pr) >u 0(ξ) and f(p) ≤ f(z);33 so it remains ambiguous whether the
distance between parties’ oﬀers increases or decreases relative to the case in which parties are
risk neutral.
Appendix B: Three-oﬀers game










3} be the triplets chosen by the regulator and the ﬁrm, respectively. As in the
two-oﬀers case, we know that in equilibrium p
f
k >p r
k for k =1 ,2,3. Adopting the convention
that in equilibrium pi
3 ≥ pi
2 ≥ pi


























































































































given, so the equilibrium is found by simultaneously solving 6 ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs).
Denote by [pi
k] the FOC corresponding to the oﬀer k by party i.
33Unless f(z) is U-shaped or signiﬁcantly skewed.























F(z4)=F(z3)+F(z5) − 1/2 − (p
f
1 − pr



















Given that each of the 6 FOCs is a linear combination of three other FOCs (in particular,









3]), we have only 4 equations for 6 unknowns.
Letting ∆2 = p
f
2 − pr
2 > 0 and ∆3 = p
f
3 − pr
3 > 0 be our arbitrary choices, the same arguments
employed in Proposition 3 imply that there is a unique equilibrium for any given ∆2 and ∆3.
And since f(z1)=f(z7), f(z2)=f(z6), f(z3)=f(z5) and F(z4)=1 /2 solves the system above
for any ∆2 > 0, ∆3 > 0 and symmetric density function, uniqueness implies that z4 = z,t h a t
i s ,p a r t i e s ’o ﬀers are centered around the mean z.




1] to obtain (after some rearrangement)
pf − pr =1 /f(z4) − (p
f
1 − pr








a n dt h e nr e p l a c ef(z1)=f(z7), f(z2)=f(z6), f(z3)=f(z5) and z4 = z to ﬁnally obtain











Since f(z1) ≤ f(z2) ≤ f(z3) ≤ f(z) (unless f(·) is U-shaped) and p
f
k >p r
k for k =1 ,2, and 3,
the distance between the parties’ overall oﬀers (i.e., pf −pr)c a n n o tb es m a l l e rt h a nt h ed i s t a n c e
in the single-oﬀer game.
27Table 1. Firms’ characteristics, parties’ oﬀers and settlements
Firm Location Size Ownership pr pf ps FOA
ESSAT I 3.3 state 100 148 118 yes
ESSAN II 3.3 state 100 110 106 no
EMSSAT III 1.9 state 100 112 102 no
ESSCO IV 4.1 state 100 128 108 no
ESVAL V 12.9 private 100 184 141 yes
SMAPA MR 4.7 state 100 125 107 no
Aguas Cordillera MR 2.7 private 100 156 113 no
Aguas Andinas MR 37.2 private 100 256 139 yes
ESSEL VI 4.3 private 100 137 109 no
ESSAM VII 4.7 state 100 131 113 yes
ESSBIO VIII 10.8 private 100 115 104 no
ESSAR IX 4.4 state 100 127 112 no
ESSAL X 3.9 private 100 146 117 yes
EMSSA XI 0.6 state 100 137 108 no
ESMAG XII 1.2 state 100 119 109 no
source: Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (Agency of Water Services).
Size is the fraction of consumers served from the total number of consumers
28